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Abstract 
The growing complexity of parliamentary ethics regulation adopted over the last decades 
makes the systematic examination of its nature and the rationales underpinning regulatory 
choices an important endeavour. In this paper we introduce conceptualizations and 
measurements of conflict of interest (COI) regulation directed towards assuring the 
impartial and unbiased decision-making of national parliamentarians. We distinguish the 
strictness of rules, the nature of enforcement, sanctions and transparency requirements as 
core elements defining COI regimes. Applying our framework to 27 European democracies, 
we select two cases for in-depth analysis in which legislators chose very different solutions 
as response to growing pressures to regulate themselves to explore inductively the drivers 
underpinning the choice of COI mechanisms: the UK adopting a highly transparency-
oriented and Belgium adopting a highly sanction-oriented COI regime. Echoing neo-
institutionalist perspectives, the longitudinal analyses indicate how distinct answers to 
similar functional pressures are shaped by the two democracies’ different institutional 
environments.  
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Contemporary democracies have adopted a variety of accountability mechanisms for 
assuring that office holders act in the public interest (Olsen 2017: 30).2 Trying to prevent the 
misuse of political power, they aim at establishing trust and bolstering the legitimacy of 
representative democracy which is widely perceived to be in decline (Dalton 2004; 
Rosanvallon 2008). Mechanisms applicable to elected office-holders have gained particular 
prominence as the ‘rule makers’ are also the ‘rule takers’ (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 13), i.e. 
office-holders often regulate themselves in sensitive areas such as the setting of MP 
salaries, regulation of expenses, parliamentary grants or funding for political parties (e.g. 
Demmke and Henökl2007: 35; Clark 2015; Biezen and Kopecký 2008; Allen 2011; 
CasalBértoaet al. 2014). Declining trust in traditional democratic institutions in conjunction 
with the rising complexity of regulation trying to remedy this problem make research on 
newly adopted accountability mechanisms paramount (Olsen 2017).  
This paper conceptualizes and empirically investigates (cross-nationally and 
longitudinally) conflict of interest (COI) regulation3 applied to parliamentarians in European 
democracies, an area that was traditionally characterized by self-regulation which has 
become less and less acceptable leading to what Williams has called an ‘ethics eruption’ 
(Williams 2006: 29; Atkinson and Mancuso 1991: 475; Allen 2008a; Saint-Martin 2008). The 
striking expansion of ethics regulation – including COI regulation– has been the subject to 
much debate. Meanwhile, the growing diversity of different combinations of COI 
mechanisms (e.g. Demke 2007; Nikolov 2013; Rose-Ackerman 2014) raises an equally 
                                                          
2 Accountability mechanisms are understood as a set of behavioural rules and organized practices, according to 
which office holders have to justify their behaviour and performance and face sanctions for misbehaviour and 
power abuse (Olsen 2017: 30). 
3 Following James (2000: 327), regulation is defined as directed towards “achieving public goals using rules or 
standards of behaviour backed up by sanctions or rewards of the state”, i.e. only rules are considered with 





important puzzle about specific regulatory choices that has received less attention - namely 
which mechanisms different democracies choose to develop their COI regimes and why. 
 
To address this question, we draw on comparative law to define COI regulation broadly as 
all formal-legal mechanisms directed towards either preventing or disclosing those 
situations in which public officials’ impartial and objective exercise of professional duties 
might be compromised (Messick 2014: 114-115; Nikolov 2013: 412). Importantly, this 
definition captures bans and incompatibility rules on the one hand and disclosure 
requirements on the other, i.e. the full spectrum of COI mechanisms, which contrasts with 
existing cross-national studies, which tend to focus on financial asset disclosure (e.g. 
Djankov et al 2010; Krambia-Kapardis 2013; van Aaken and Voigt 2011).  
Drawing on historical institutionalist theory we expect the choice of COI mechanisms 
to be shaped by institutional contexts emerging out of long-term path-dependent processes 
rather than by functional considerations how best to solve the problem at hand (Thelen 
1999; Fioretos et al. 2016). More specifically, we draw on the strand of literature focusing 
on the institutionally determined variance of national administrative traditions and styles of 
regulation (Knill 1998; Adam et al 2017). Based on an analytical framework capturing the 
multidimensionality of this complex area of regulation, we comparatively assess core 
dimensions of COI regimes across 27 European democracieswith the help of three newly 
developed indices. This grounds our selection of Belgium and the UK as ‘extreme cases’ in 







To propose tools for cross-national and longitudinal analysis of core elements of COI 
regulation and to explore whether and how institutional features shape the particular 
choice of COI mechanisms adopted is central to understand the working and evolution of 
increasingly elaborate and diverse ethics regimes applied to public office-holders. The 
insight that choices of COI mechanisms are shaped by internal, institutional factors has 
central implications for debates around regulatory innovation understood as processes that 
seek to encourage the development of domestic regulation according to ‘best practice’ 
standards provided by external organizations (Lodge 2005: 650): if the choice of different 
COI mechanisms as qualitatively different responses to the same problem is driven by the 
nature of the institutional setting in which parliamentarians operate, the scope of regulatory 
convergence through transnational communication is considerably restricted (Holzinger and 
Knill 2005: 790; Lodge 2003). This is highly salient in light of wide-spread attempts of 
international organisations such as the OECD or the Council of Europe to promote the 
adoption of specific COI mechanisms as “good practices” (e.g. OECD 2005; GRECO 2014a). 
Similarly, as far as the adoption of specific (and possibly particularly effective) COI 
mechanisms is unlikely due their ‘misfit’ with the given institutional environment, ethics 
reforms are less likely to resolve the problems they are – at least officially - supposed to 
address.  
The paper is structured as follows. We first specify our research puzzle on the 
distinctiveness of regulatory choices used to address COI problems in the parliamentary 
arena, which we expect - in line with historical institutionalist theory - to be shaped by 
institutional factors that generate internal regulatory dispositions. We then present 
concepts and measures that allow us to assess the complexity of COI regimes comparatively 





depth study. The longitudinal analyses of UK and Belgian COI regulation reveal how 
entrenched institutional features structuring the political process constrain the choice of 
COI mechanisms when parliamentarians are pressured to adopt stricter ethics rules. We 
conclude by summarizing our findings and suggest avenues for future research. 
  
Regulatory Dispositions and the Choice of COI Mechanisms: Theoretical Expectations 
The expansion of COI regulation raises two fundamental questions. Its growth points to the 
puzzle why parliamentarians adopt and expand COI regulation which increasingly constrains 
their own behaviour. The growing diversity of COI mechanisms across democracies (e.g. 
Demmke et al 2008; Nikolov 2013; Rose-Ackerman 2014) points to the puzzle of what leads 
parliamentarians in different settings – when adopting stricter regulation – to choose such 
distinct COI mechanisms to strengthen their parliamentary ethics regimes, despite 
numerous parallels in the problem pressures parliamentarians are exposed to. This paper 
deals with this second puzzle from an historical-institutionalist perspective.  
According to this perspective, COI regulation can be understood as a set of 
formalized rules ‘that assign normatively backed rights and responsibilities to actors’ - in our 
case parliamentarians - whose stability is not solely reliant on the self-interest of those 
involved but is a matter of ‘public interest’ (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 10-2). In many 
democracies the reform of COI regulation is best characterized as ‘displacement’: as the 
traditional configuration – i.e. the self-regulation of parliamentary ethics – has been 
discredited, alternative institutional solutions are cultivated (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 19-
20). While COI regulation has been generally pushed into a more constraining direction, we 





follow particular institutional logics. As institutions are perceived as arising out of long-term 
processes shaping historical development along a specific “path” (Mahoney 2000; Pierson 
2004), the same functional pressures are unlikely to generate cross-national convergence of 
reform choices. Instead, the effects of problem pressures are expected to be mediated by 
institutional features of the setting in which a reform takes place (Clift and Fisher 2004; 
Pollitt and Bouckaert 2017). Those institutional features (dis)favour the adoption of specific 
regulatory solutions depending on their (mis)fit with the respective domestic environment, 
thereby leading to different answers to the same problem (Maggetti 2012: 45; Knill 1998). 
 
To examine how institutional features shape our outcome of interest in European 
democracies, requires us to move beyond the assessment of cross-national variation in 
current regulation towards tracking the long-term evolution of COI regimes with a focus on 
the institutional factors that influence the choice of COI mechanisms (Thelen and Mahoney 
2015: 3). However, a systematic overview of cross-national differences is still essential to 
select suitable cases for in-depth study that have adopted (similarly) strict parliamentary 
COI regulation, while having done so through different types of COI mechanisms.  
In the following we present the analytical tools that are used to explore the core 
elements of COI regulation first across 27 European democracies and second over time 
within two case studies. 
 
The Comparative Study Conflict of Interest Regulation 
Defining Conflict of Interest Regulation  -Preventive vs. Disclosing Mechanisms 
To capture the diversity of COI mechanisms, we define COI regulation broadly as the range 





incompatibility rules) or disclosing situations (e.g. through transparency requirements) 
where public officials’ impartial and objective exercise of professional duties might be 
compromised (Messick 2014: 114-115; Nikolov 2013: 412). This distinction allows us to 
systematically map out distinct types of constraints imposed on the office-holders across 
central substantive areas of COI regulation (e.g. the receipt of gifts or the holding of 
ancillary posts; see for all areas covered Table 1 below)and allows us to consider the 
compensatory nature between them: preventive mechanisms that restrict politicians in what 
they can legally do (e.g. through incompatibilities rules or bans) decrease the need for 
disclosure requirements, essential to arrive at unbiased cross-national measures of COI 
regulation.  
 
Core Elements of COI Regimes, the Range of COI Mechanisms and their Purpose 
Drawing on previous research (Allen 2008b: 56-7), we distinguish four basic elements of COI 
regimes reflecting distinct ways of constraining the behaviour of the office-holder they 
apply to (i.e. reflecting distinct purposes regulatory  mechanisms are directed towards): the 
strictness of rules and the enforcement structures underpinning them capture aspects in the 
regime that ought to increase the likelihood that formal COI violations are officially detected 
and notified; COI sanctions capture the costs imposed on parliamentarians when COI 
violations are detected and transparencyrequirements capturethe institutional conditions 
for third party control. 
Table 1 categorizes the range of COI mechanisms according to the analytical distinctions 





Table 1:Four Elements of COI Regimes, COI Mechanisms and their Purpose 




Purpose of COI mechanisms Specification of COI mechanisms covered  
Strictness of rules 
Preventive 
  
 To prohibit biased behavior of parliamentarians 
  
Bans or restrictions on public and private accessory activities, assets, 
contracts with state authorities, employment offers (or cooling off 
regulations), income, liabilities, third party contacts, use of confidential 




 To revealbiased behavior of parliamentarians 
 
Requirements to disclose public and private accessory activities, assets, 
contracts with state authorities, employment offers (or cooling off 
regulations), income, liabilities, third party contacts, use of confidential 




 To officially detect violations of preventive COI 
rules 
Regulation ofenforcement body (its mandate and independence) 
monitoring implementation of preventive COI regulation 
Disclosing 
 To officially detect violations of disclosing COI 
rules  
Regulation ofenforcement body (its mandate and independence) 
monitoring implementation of disclosing COI regulation 
Sanctions  
Preventive 
 Define costs for the violation of preventive COI 
rules 
Non-criminal (e.g. fines) and/or criminal sanctions 
Disclosing 
 Define costs for the violation of disclosing COI 
rules 
Non-criminal (e.g. fines) and/or criminal sanctions 
Transparency 
Preventive 
 To facilitate third party control (media, societal 
actors or citizens) of the impartiality of 
parliamentarians 
Requirements to disclose information; scope of publicly available 
information; requirements to release information on violations of 
preventive rules (‘shaming through transparency’) 
Disclosing 
 To facilitate third party control (media, societal 
actors or citizens) of the impartiality of 
parliamentariansdecision-makers 
Requirements to disclose information; scope of publicly available 
information; requirements to release information on violations of 
disclosing rules (‘shaming through transparency’) 
                                                          
4 This contains two categories of regulation: those that obligate MPs to declare regarding individual decisions that they are affected by a conflict of interest (while still being 
able to participate) or provisions that require MPs to excuse themselves. 






By definition, if conflicts of interest remain unregulated, parliamentarians cannot violate any 
rules. Vice versa, the higher the number of areas, in which COI mechanisms are adopted 
(e.g. regulation of gifts, accessory posts, assets), the stricter and less ambiguous these rules 
are (e.g. the complete ban of certain behaviours), the more likely rule violations occur 
andbecome visible.We consequently assess a COI regime’s rule strictness by capturing the 
type of COI mechanism employed (preventive and disclosing) and rank the respective 
regulatory configurations according to the constraints they imply for parliamentarians in 
each of the core areas of COI regulation listed in Table 1 (rows 1 and 2, right-hand column).6 
The logic underpinning our COI Strictness Index illustrated by the example of the 
regulation of gifts: Score “zero” indicates the absence of constraints (neither preventive nor 
disclosure mechanisms are in place), meaning all gifts to MPs are allowed and there is no 
need for declaration. Score “one” indicates a relatively more constraining regime that 
requires disclosure but again does not prohibit the receiving of gifts. This configuration is 
followed – in terms of constraints - by two configurations that combine preventive and 
disclosing elements – a partial prevention of gifts (i.e. above a certain size gifts are banned) 
without the permitted gifts being declared (assigned a “two”), followed by a partial 
prevention of gifts where all permitted gifts need to be declared (assigned a “three”). 
Finally, we can think of regimes that regulate this area through a purely preventive strategy 
by banning all gifts which is assigned score “four” indicating the highest level of constraint. 
The interplay of the two logics - prevention versus disclosure - is visualized in Table 2. 
 
 
                                                          






Table 2: Combinations of Legal Mechanisms and Rule Strictness Scores 
Prevention on COI No rules No rules Restrictions Restrictions Total ban 
Disclosure of COI No rules Disclosure No rules Disclosure - 
Overall COI  
strictness score 
0 1 2 3 4 
Note: The darker the coloring, the higher the level of constraint in the combination of mechanisms. 
 
If COI rules are monitored and their violation investigated and confirmed byenforcement 
structures formally in charge of implementing COI rules, the official detection of rule 
violations is most likely (Allen 2011: 213; Rosenthal 2005: 158; see also Gay 2006). If such 
COI-specificmonitoring bodies or units exist, we assess the nature of these bodies (or body – 
some countries use the same body for both types of COI rules, others use separate ones) 
considering their motivation and the capacity to monitor. Regarding the motivation to 
monitor, we assesswhether enforcement bodies are independent from parliament and not 
affiliated with any political party (Nassmacher 2003: 13; Clark 2015). Regarding monitoring 
capacity, we assess whether the body can examine the correctness of information provided 
by parliamentarians in relation to preventive or disclosing COI rules or not. 
 A strong enforcement structure for the implementation of regulation is usually 
associated with the capacity to sanction rule violations (e.g. Nassmacher 2003; O’Halloran 
2011; Mattarella 2014). We nonetheless treat the sanctions underpinning COI rules as a 
separate element. First, COI sanctions impose a different type of constraint on the public 
office-holders. While strict rules combined with strong enforcement structures make it less 
likely that parliamentarians can hope for violations not to be officially detected, sanctions 
shape the relative costs of rule violations once they are detected. Second, the assumed link 





to violations of COI regulations are attached to or controlled by enforcement structures 
established for dealing with COI issue. We might have a COI regime that does not contain 
any enforcement structures specifically in charge of COI regulation. Yet COI violations might 
be underpinned by criminal sanctions controlled by courts. Focusing on sanctions as 
controlled by enforcement structures in charge of COI monitoring (rather than on the full 
range of sanctions underpinning COI rules) would lead to misleading comparative 
evaluations of COI regimes’ properties.The costs of rule violations as defined by COI 
sanctions vary with the type of sanctions. In line with earlier work (CasalBértoa et al. 2014; 
Matterella 2014) criminal sanctions are treated as more constraining than non-criminal 
ones(e.g. fines). Hence, we differentiate between sanction regimes using non-criminal 
sanctions, criminal sanctions, or both.7 
 
Rather than mere intra-institutional disclosure to a monitoring body, public transparency 
requirements (usually releasing informationonline) can provide the basis for ‘third party 
control’ by the media, interested organizations or individual citizens (Djankov et al 2010). 
We consider whether information is disclosed publically (whether no public access is 
possible, information is provided on request, or there is a free access via printed or online 
mass media); the scope (or completeness) of information that is made publicly available 
(whether the institutions that release information to the public present all or only part of 
the information they receive about the parliamentarian); and finally whether information 
about rule violations by MPs is released or not, a form of ‘shaming through 
                                                          
7 For our COI Sanction Index, we use the following coding categories: a country gets the lowest sanctions score 
(“zero”) if it does not have any sanctions for either violations of preventive or disclosing mechanisms. It 
isfollowed by regimes that have non-criminal sanctions for both types of rules, which is followed by those that 
add criminal sanctions either to back up preventive or disclosing rules. The highest score means the regime has 
criminal and administrative sanctions to address both the violation of preventive and of disclosing rules 





transparency’.8Transparency measures are sometimes considered as a possible substitute 
for a strong institutional enforcement structure or as a complement to the latter 
(Nassmacher 2003: 10-12). As with sanctions, we treat transparency measures separately 
from COI enforcement.Indeed, the mere release of information on MPs’ activities to the 
public might allow for third party control but does not necessarily contribute to the capacity 
of the COI regime to detect officially recognized non-compliance with COI rules - the 
theoretical underpinning of COI enforcement. While problematic practices might be 
occasionally picked up by the media and thereby generate reputational costs for the 
individual MP concerned (Krambia-Karpadis 2013: 46), this is not equivalent to the 
systematic monitoring of rule compliance by a public body detecting formal misconduct 
(Allen 2011: 213). 
 
Developing Cross-National Measures to Capture the Multidimensionality of COI Regimes 
To measure the four COI elements across a wider range of democracies, we compiled a new 
dataset on the properties of parliamentary COI regulation based on the evaluation reports 
released by the “Group of States Against Corruption” (GRECO) which applies the collaborative 
practice of peer review to assess the performance of its member states (De Francesco 2016: 
354).9 More specifically, we drew on data from the 4thGRECO round on “Corruption 
prevention in respect of members of Parliament, judges and prosecutors”, which provides 
the most encompassing and standardized information on COI regimes in place in European 
                                                          
8A COI regime has a transparency rank of “eleven” if all the transparency options are coded as present, which 
indicates the maximum possible level of transparency with regard to both preventive and disclosure rules and 
a “zero” if none are present. Rank “five” is assigned to regimes that, for instance, have transparency 
requirements in relation to both preventive and disclosing rules, yet in either case the scope of the 
information published is limited, while no information on rule violations is released. Note this is only one 
possible institutional constellation that might receive a rank “five”. 
9Greco is an international forum which is part of the Council of Europe. Greco was established in 1999 to 





democracies in the years 2012-15.10  We restricted our sample to fully consolidated 
European democracies to assure basic unit homogeneity in terms of the centrality of 
parliamentary institutions, rule of law and of the basic administrative capacity to implement 
the regulation. This left us with a sample of 27 countries.11 
Based on the specification of COI mechanisms detailed in the section above, we 
constructed an index for each core element: rule strictness, enforcement, sanctions and 
transparency. For each index we made use of rankings and a linear aggregation method. 
This choice is important as we are interested in capturing constraints across several COI 
dimensions with various predictors on an ordinal scale. As most composite indicators (OECD 
2008: 31) our indices are basedon equal weights, emphasizing equal importance of 
indicators inherent in COI regimes. All indices are standardized from zero to one.12 
 
How do the four dimensions relate? The Spearman test indicates that rule strictness and 
strictness of enforcementpositively, highly and significantly correlate (N=27, ρ= 0.73, p<.01). 
Wetherefore use one‘COI Strictness Index’, encompassing these two dimensions, capturing 
– in line with our conceptualization - the likelihood that formal COI violations are officially 
detected and notified.The other elements, in contrast,constitute separate dimensions. The 
‘COI Sanction Index’ and the ‘COI Transparency Index’ correlate with the COI Strictness 
Index moderately (ρ=0.53, p<.01 and ρ=0.42, p<.05 respectively). The Spearman test 
between the COI Sanction Index and the COI Transparency Index is not significant indicating 
                                                          
10 Even though the ethics regulation adopted for first and second houses of parliament (or national and 
regional chambers) can differ, we focus on the regulation of members of the first house of parliament as the 
central legislative decision-making body in a democracy which is bound to attract most attention and be 
subject of most concern.  
11 Details on the data source and coding are given in Appendix A. 
12 Details of the computation of the four indices based on the indicators specified above are available in the 





the two dimensions’ independence (ρ=0.2, p>.31).Consequently, the multidimensional 
nature of European democracies is best analyzed along three dimensions.13 
 
The Diversity of COI Regimes in 27 European Democracies: Selecting Cases for In-Depth 
Study 
Figure 1 visualizes the distribution of the three COI indices across the 27 democracies 
covered, grouped into old vs. new democracies. This is done as previous research points to 
substantial regulatory differences between these two groups (e.g. Biezen2008; 2012; 
CasalBértoa et al 2014).14 It shows thatnew democracies, on average, tend towardsstricter 
COI regulation than old democracies. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test indicates that the 
difference between the new and old democracies on the COI Strictness Index and on the COI 
Sanction Index is statistically significant (z=2.99, p<.01 and z=2.68, p<.01, respectively). 
Furthermore, Figure 1 displays the relative variability of each of the indicators within the 
subsamples, showing that new democracies tend to be less internally diverse.15Unlike old 
democracies, new democracies have been subject to more intense external pressures to 
adopt ethics regulation as a part of a ‘good governance agenda’ promoted by international 




                                                          
13See Online Appendix C for country scores for all indices across the sample. 
14 In line with earlier studies we categorized democracies stable since WWII plus Malta and Cyprus as old 
democracies and the Southern democracies Spain, Portugal and Greece plus the Central European 
democracies as new democracies (see Figure 1 below for details). 





Figure 1: Distribution of COI Indices across 27 European Democracies 
 
Source: Own data 
 
Considering the differences displayed by Figure 1, we select two old democracies to carry 
out a paired comparison of factors driving the longitudinal development of COI regimes, as in 
these systems regulatory choices can be more unambiguously linked to domestic 
institutional factors that constrain the selection of reform options according to the historical 
institutionalist approach (Lodge 2003). Hence, the selection of old democracies (which have 
developed their current COI regime over many decades) minimizes the influence of 
conditionality monitoring mechanisms, which in the case of new democracies interact or 






Suitable for an exploratory investigation of systemic dispositions shaping COI regulation 
over time, we moreover choose two extreme cases, which maximize differences in the COI 
regulatory strategies chosen by old democracies.16 This is done based on countries’ COI 
Sanction and COI Transparency scores, which – as shown earlier - are independent of each 
other, i.e. reflect separate regulatory strategies. Figure 2 shows the discrepancy between 
COI Sanction and COI Transparency scores across the 27 democracies, hence, the extent to 
which democracies develop their COI regime through transparency measures rather than 
sanctions or vice versa.17 Most countries put a stronger emphasis on sanctions than 
transparency. Only one of 13 new democracies stresses transparency more than sanctions - 
Croatia. Importantly, we find more variation among old democracies: six of them stress 
transparency over sanctions; eight of them show the reverse patterns, showing a much 
more balanced distribution of ‘regulatory dispositions’. We choose the two old democracies 
with the biggest discrepancy between COI Sanction and COI Transparency scores from our 




                                                          
16Matching procedure based on propensity scores is not possible for our small-N sample. 
17 As both indices are standardized between 0 and 1, they could be subtracted from each other. The difference 






Figure 2: Discrepancies between COI Sanctions and COI Transparency across 27 
Democracies 
 
Consequently, the selection of the UK and Belgium as extreme cases to engage in a pair-
wise comparison of COI evolution has several advantages: first, it is particularly suitable to 
explore the trajectories of COI reform as they allow us to distil the drivers underlying the 
distinct regulatory choices that pushed the nature of the two COI regimes into a 
transparency-oriented (UK) as opposed to sanction-oriented direction (Belgium) “in 
especially stark or obvious forms” (Bennett 2004: 40; Seawright and Gerring 2008: 297). 
Second, they are among the four old democracies with the highest COI Strictness scores (see 
Figure C1, Online Appendix C). Both have repeatedly suffered from serious political crises 
that pushed parliamentarians to tighten their COI regimes over the last decades, a similarity 












































































































































the overall trend towards stricter COI regulation as a given. Third, given our interest in the 
influence on COI regimes of regulatory dispositions underpinning democracies’ domestic 
institutional settings, these can be more easily ‘isolated’ in old democracies less influenced 
by international pressures. 
 
 
The Long-Term Evolution of COI Regimes in the UK and Belgium 
As earlier studies on regulatory reform (e.g. Clift and Fisher 2004; Jones 2007; Quack and 
Djelic 2005; Little et al 2013; Hine and Peele 2016), we reconstruct the evolution of COI 
regimes applicable to national parliamentarians in the UK and Belgium from the 
introduction of the first COI elements until 2015 using document analysis. The latter 
combines primary legislation and regulation as well as failed draft proposals, backed up by 
parliamentary debate and official reports justifying provisions, their amendment or 
rejection, complemented by secondary literature.  
 
UK: The Evolution of a Transparency-Oriented COI Regime 
Though conflicts of interest have been long regulated by parliamentary conventions alone, 
over time, the House of Commons (HoC) has adopted an increasing number of resolutions 
formalizing those conventions and made existing provisions stricter, usually in the aftermath 
of scandals in an attempt to re-establish public confidence(Hine and Peele 2016). 
The transparency dimension has been strengthened most unambiguously. This 





public register to disclose MPs’ pecuniary interests, and the formalization of the long-
standing convention for MPs to have to declare financial interests in parliamentary debate 
(House resolution of May 22 1974). Both provisions were overseen by a permanent select 
committee created in 1976.18 In the aftermath of the Poulson bankruptcy hearings of 1972 
which revealed that MPs took bribes to secure lucrative government contracts, the pressure 
to create a compulsory register (which had been proposed before but rejected) had become 
intense. While the proposal to publish MPs’ income tax return was rejected due to privacy 
considerations, the new register aimed at protecting the public reputation of the House. The 
resolution required the register to be “available for public inspection” – annually published 
in the House of Commons paper.19Transparency was further strengthened by the online 
publication of the register introduced as partof the Nolan reforms in 1995 in the aftermath 
of the Matrix Churchill affair of 1992 and the cash for questions scandal of 1994. The 
proposal to hold evidence hearings of the committee in public, however, was again 
rejected.20 As far as ‘shaming through transparency’ goes, initially unresolved disputes 
about non-compliance – be it regarding asset or conflict of interest declarations - would 
initially go to the select committee overseeing the Members’ register without the MP’s 
name being mentioned. Transparency of (suspected or established) non-compliance was 
eventually introduced in 2010, in the aftermath of the expenses scandal. Since then, 
information on all inquiries (including relevant evidence) and outcomes (concerning 
                                                          
18 Since 1967 there was a voluntary register established by Liberal MPs, available for public inspection, Aspects 
of Nolan – Members’ Financial Interests, Research Paper 95/62, 16 May 1995, Home Affairs Section, HoC 
Library, p. 1 
19Ibid, pp. 4, 6. 
20 Ibid, pp. 31-2. See also: https://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/standards-and-financial-
interests/parliamentary-commissioner-for-standards/registers-of-interests/register-of-members-financial-





disclosing and preventive rules) are released online. 21  Statistics about complaints, 
identifying Members under inquiry, are published monthly (GRECO 2013: 19). These basic 
steps were accompanied by expanding what ought to be included in the asset declarations, 
i.e. enhanced rule strictness, thereby making transparency requirements more 
significant.While strongly held notions about popular control of representatives are central 
to British parliamentary traditions, recent developments took place in a context of strong 
legal provisions to assure freedom of information that shaped parliamentary regulation 
generally, as illustrated by the expenses scandal triggered by freedom of information 
requests.22 
 
Comparing the use of disclosing as compared to preventive constraintsmore generally, the 
UK system relies much more on the former than latter. Considering the following much 
debated preventive measure is indicative for a disinclination to impose actual constraints on 
MP behaviour: in 1996, the newly created Code of Conduct of the House enshrined a pre-
existing ban on paid advocacy and expanded it. Already since 1947 a House resolution 
prohibited initiation of parliamentary proceedings solely or principally due to a contractual 
agreement with an outside interest, as such practices would undermine MPs’ ability to 
represent constituency and broader society in favour of sectional interests. After 1992 the 
regulation was tightened with MPs needing to declare their interest in select committees, 
not only in debate, and stand aside if their pecuniary interests were concerned.23 The post-
Nolan regulations then prohibited the initiating of proceedings as well as participating in any 
                                                          
21 Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards: Review of the Guide to the Rules relating to the Conduct of 
Members, Consultation Paper, 19 January 2012, p. 46. 
22 The Freedom of Information Act 2000 in force since 2005, allows members of the public to request 
disclosure of information from public bodies. 
23 Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards: Review of the Guide to the Rules relating to the Conduct of 





delegation to ministers or public officials24, while introducing rules regulating the use of 
confidential information (Coxall 2001: 103). A proposed ban on holding consultancies with 
multi-client lobbying companies recommended by Nolan, however, was not picked up 
(Foreman 2002: 279).Even more, in 2002, the 1996 regulationwas relaxed, allowing 
initiation and participation in proceedings as long as doing so does not generate ‘exclusive 
benefit’ to someone the member has financial relationship to, meaningas long as at least 
one less dominant provider benefits as well. Despite criticisms that this provision de facto 
legitimizes MPs to “undertake lobbying which might substantially have benefited a 
dominant presence in a particular market”25 and renewed debates around it in 2010 and 
2012, it has remained unaltered until today. This was justified by the importance of MPs 
being able to bring their current outside experience to parliamentary proceedings26, 
arguably being incompatible with any effective restrictions on their ability to lobby for the 
interests they are involved with, as long as they declare their financial interests in the 
process. 
 
Similarly, resistance against independent enforcement and a more robust sanction regime 
shapes the COI regime until today. This is justified referring to reputational costs imposed by 
the citizens as the ultimate sanction for politicians, while insisting that the House (i.e. MPs) 
needs to maintain sole jurisdiction over its own matters, including the sanctioning of MPs 
for breaking House rules (Oliver 1997: 543). The permanent select committee created in 
1976 to oversee the Members’ register was only entitled to act when getting complaints but 
would ‘under no circumstances’ act as enforcement officer with powers to inquire in 
                                                          
24Ibin, pp.35-6. 
25Ibin, p.39. 
26Ibin, p.38-40. See also: Committee on Standards and Privileges, Ninth Report of Session 2010-12, HC 654, 





circumstances of members. 27 The Nolan reform in the mid-1990s strengthenedCOI 
enforcement.The new commissioner for standards dealing with MP violations of COI 
regulation, however, was and is still is an officer of the House. He/she has to work with a 
Committee of Standards (composed of MPs) and – yet again - had for a long time no 
authority to proactively examine a case without a complaint being issued, though post-
Nolan they were allowed to actively check the facts and make enquiries.28Meanwhile the 
House as a whole remained the ultimate decision-maker in serious cases of misconduct.29 
Nolan’s proposal to create an offence of misuse of public office applicable to MPs failed 
(Foreman 2002: 280), being in tension with the principle of ‘parliamentary privilege’ which 
gives MPs immunity for actions or statements made in the course of their legislative 
duty.30Also later proposals to strengthen the independence of the Standards Commission, 
such as by introducing an investigative tribunal with a legal chairman were rejected.31After 
the Expenses Scandal in 2009, yet again discrediting parliamentary self-regulation, a House 
resolution in 2010 broadened the commissioner´s scope of review allowing for pro-active 
investigations(without receiving a complaint on a matter first). A report in 2012, however, 
suggested that the resolution had not been implemented.32Since 2013, three lay members 
form part of the Committee of Standards who proposed for equal numbers of MPs and lay 
                                                          
27 Aspects of Nolan – Members’ Financial Interests, Research Paper 95/62, 16 May 1995, Home Affairs Section, 
HoC Library, p. 7, 9, 25. 
28Ibin, p. 30. 
29 Summary of the Nolan Committee’s First Report on Standards in Public Life, 
www.pavs.org.uk/about/documents/TheSevenPrinciplesofPublicLife.doc, retrieved August 14 2016. 
Committee on Standards - Sixth Report -The Standards Systems in the House of Commons –Committee on 
Standards, 10 February 2015, (point 71) 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmstandards/383/38305.htm, retrieved 
August 12 2016. 
30http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ape_previous.pdf, retrieved August 14 2016.  See 
also Committee on Standards in Public Life (the Wicks Committee), Sixth Report, January 2000, 
recommendation 9. 
31 Committee on Standards in Public Life (the Wicks Committee), Sixth Report, January 2000. 
32 Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards: Review of the Guide to the Rules relating to the Conduct of 





members on the Committee, whichhas been adopted in 2015.While lay members can issue 
a ‘minority report’ to Committee publications (a right that to date has not been used), they 
have no voting rights, leaving MPs in control.33 
The regulation of COI sanctions underwent least change. Still today the House controls any 
penalties for MP misconduct which conventionally include reprimands, repayment of 
moneys, a written apology, an apology to the House or a period of suspension (with loss of 
pay and pension rights) and expulsion (last used in 1947). In 1999, a proposal for the 
introduction of fines as a sanction was made but not realized.34Until today the House code 
of conduct only contains a brief reference that sanctions can be imposed by the House, 
without specification what they are and which violations they apply to.35Only recently, the 
Sixths Report of the Committee of Standards - while recognizing that it is problematic that 
MPs have a final say over their own sanctions - pointed to ‘strong constitutional reasons 
against purely external regulation of standard issues’. The committee considered the range 
of sanctions ‘appropriate and sufficient’ and stressed the reliance of the system on 
‘reputational costs’36, which again highlights the centrality of the normative foundation of 
British democracy, whose basic functioning relies on notions of popular control exercised by 
citizens, rather than institutional checks and balances between institutions.  
 
 
                                                          
33 See: https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/standards/lay-
members/, retrieved May 30 2018. 
34Ibin, p.5. 
35 The Standing Order of the House only refers to possible sanctions (withdrawal from the House, suspension 
from the services of the House) for grossly disorderly behaviour or disobedience (Art 44, 45), 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmstords/700/700.pdf, retrieved November 20 2016 
36The Standards Systems in the House of Commons – Sixth Report- Committee on Standards, 10 February 
2015, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmstandards/383/38305.htm, retrieved 





Belgium: The Evolution of a Sanction-Oriented COI Regime 
Though some COI mechanisms go back to the 1930s, the development of the COI regime as 
it exists today started in the 1990s. Since the 1991 election, in which alienation between 
citizens and established parties triggered the national breakthrough of the extreme right 
Vlaams Block party, the Belgian political system has been confronted with major governance 
crises. The Augusta-Dassault affair37, a corruption scandal, as well as policy failures like the 
phaedophilia Dutroux’s case, exacerbated the crisis in the late 1990s. Belgium scored 
relatively low on the level of perceived corruption and almost no MPs were convicted of 
corruption in connection with their mandates (GRECO 2014b: 4). Meanwhile, Belgium was 
one of the countries with the highest level of party patronage in Western Europe (Müller 
2000: 151). Hence, the overall legitimacy of the system rather than the failures of particular 
MPs fueled reform debates (Maesschalck and Van de Walle 2006: 1012). COI regulation 
became a part of wider statutory reforms of public governance (inter alia federalization, 
public management reform, anticorruption) launched to restore public trust, with COI 
regulation applicable to public officials (including parliamentarians) aiming at curbing 
partisan control of the Belgian state (DeWinter and Brans 2003; Transparency International 
2012; Van de Walle, Thijs and Bouckaert 2005).  
Among the core COI elements sanctions have been reinforced most unambiguously, while 
transparency measures were only adopted reluctantly. In the late 1980s, calls for disclosing 
mechanisms emergedto complement long-existingpreventive rules such as restrictions on 
the concurrent holding of public offices introduced by the Belgian Constitution 1831 and 
                                                          
37The scandal broke in the early 1990s over bribes that had been paid in the procurement of helicopters for the 
military. Several high-profile politicians, including several government ministers from the Walloon and Flemish 





reinforced in the Law of 6th August 1931, which also contained the requirement of a 
“cooling off” period for MPs before being appointed to other paid public positions. Calls for 
transparency gained further saliencyin the 1990s as consociational bargaining between 
major government parties was increasingly considered dysfunctional (Peters 2006: 
1081),and MPsbeing suspected to serve hidden interests.38 
The first set of laws introducing the disclosure of declarations of interests (covering 
appointments, activities and professions) was passed on 2nd May 1995. Parliamentary 
debates predating this show MPs’ reservations though. Such declarations – so the argument 
–would provide incentives for politicians to no longer take on outside positions crucial for 
the development of technical skills and competences39 (an argument used in the UK to fend 
off stricter rules on paid advocacy). More significantly, the initial legislative proposal of 1993 
planned to make asset declarations public as well, to let citizens decide whether MPs are 
subject to conflicts of interest. This was substituted in the 1995 legislation by a requirement 
to provide an asset declaration in a sealed envelope to the Court of Accounts which could 
only be opened in the event of a criminal investigation for illicit enrichment. MPs justified 
this provision following recommendations of the Belgian data protection authority, which 
indicated that publicly open declarations restrict MPs’ privacy and might lead to harmful 
consequences for MPs, their spouses and relatives. 40  Instead of publishing MPs’ 
declarations, the 1995 lawsrequired the publication of a ´black list´ of those MPs who failed 
to submit declarations of interest or asset declarations to publically shame non-compliant 
MPs. 
                                                          
38Senate de Belgique, Doc. Parl., 1994-1995, n. 1334/3, p. 3 and 21. 
39Senate de Belgique, Doc. Parl., 1994-1995, n. 1334/3, p. 4. 
40Chambre des Representants de Belgique, Doc. Parl., 1995-1996, 457/6, p. 15; Senate de Belgique, Doc. Parl., 





Already watered down, this legislation only existed on paper for many years. In a 
country like Belgium the Rechtsstaat administrative tradition requires that the procedural 
details of rule application and enforcement are codified by law. The broad scope of COI 
regulation encompassing thousands of individuals across different categories of public office 
holders at the national and local levelsfurther heightened the already high costs for passing 
operational provisions in the fragmented consociational Belgian system due to struggles 
over how to apply the same framework to such a diversity of officials.  Meanwhile, some 
MPs pushed for delays given the uncertainty on when and how declarations should be 
lodged and reviewed. 41  Consequently, operational provisions wereonly adopted in 
2004leading to the publication of the first ´black list´ in 2005, nine years after the initial law 
had been passed.42 At the same time, the 2004 legislationadded a ‘procedure of resolution’ 
which allowed non-compliant MPsto appeal to the parliamentary commission deciding 
about the inclusion of MPs in the ‘black list’, thereby allowing parliament to prevent the 
public shaming of non-compliant MPs. It further allowed for corrections to be made to 
declarations at different stages, including afternon-compliance had been detected, reducing 
instances in which non-compliance areopenly publicized (GRECO 2014b: 21).   
The publication of declarations of interestin the official gazette was delayed even 
longer (17 years after the 1995 law, 8 years after the 2004 operational provisions) as 
disagreement on its content persisted until 2012.43Proposals to disclose compensation for 
public jobs were presented in 2006 and 2010 and for all jobs in 2015 (along with a new call 
for the publication of asset declarations), complemented by recommendations by GRECO to 
enhance public disclosure (2017: 3-4). All of them were rejected reflecting parliamentary 
                                                          
41 See Senate de Belgique, Doc. Parl, 1997-1998, 621/12, pp. 15-78. 
42Ordinary and Special Laws of 26th June 2004. 





traditions not granting extensive rights to access information about the legislature in a 
context where privacy is constitutionally protected (Article 22). Freedom of information 
applies only to the administrative functions of parliament as an institution, while MPs enjoy 
the same protections of privacy as ordinary citizens.44 
 
In the meantime, long-standing preventive measures were strengthened. The Law of 5th 
April 1999 prohibited MPs to become board members of public companies, reinforcing the 
long existing provisions included in the Belgian Constitution and in the 1931 Law (see 
above). Moreover, parliamentary mandates could not be combined with more than one 
paid executive office and a cap was set on the remuneration that could not exceed the 
equivalent of half of the parliamentary allowance (DeWinter and Brans 2003: 61). 
Another deep political crisis a decade later opened another window of opportunity for 
reform. The coalition agreement of October 2011 suggested a major state reform to 
overcome tensions between different segments of the Belgian society (Brans, Pattyn and 
Bouckaert 2016: 453), which contained a chapter on ethics (Di Rupo 2011: 5-7). It proposed 
Codes of Deontology for both houses of parliament that were adopted on 17th and 19th 
December 2013 respectively, including disclosing and preventive measures. In the case of 
the Chamber of Representatives, the code required MPs to declare orally any conflict of 
interest in parliamentary proceedings and prohibited them to receive any financial or 
material benefit in return for acts performed in connection with their parliamentary 
mandate, including any gift which exceeded a symbolic value. The code also prohibited MPs 
to share confidential information.  
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To enforce the new code, a Federal Ethics Committee was established by the Law of 6th 
January 2014. Its composition and the appointment procedure resemblethe ones of the 
Constitutional Court to enhance the body’s independence - though the complexity of the 
appointment procedure, requiring the qualified majority of two thirds, delayed the 
appointment of its members until May 2016.45That said,independent enforcementhad 
already replaced parliamentary self-regulation by 1995 when MPs entrusted the Court of 
Accounts as an actor outside parliament trusted by MPs and the public to keep both 
declarations of interests and assets.However, its ability to operate was curtailedas long as 
operational provisionshad not been adopted (see on this above). Concerns were raised 
about the ability of the Court of Accounts to manage the excessive workload resulting from 
a declaratory system applicable not only to MPs but to thousands of office holders at the 
central and local levels. The 2004 Lawtherefore streamlined the submission procedure. 
Nonetheless,concerns remain that the Court of Accounts is not able to accurately verify the 
declarations it receive 46  and is reluctant to enforce the consequences of an 
inaccurate/incomplete declaration, which undermines the transparency of the system 
(GRECO 2014: 20-1; Court des Comptes 2015: 21-29). 
In contrast, the sanctionsunderpinning COI disclosing mechanisms introduced in 1995 were 
severe and little contested as they signaled the credibility of reform efforts in a context 
marked by severe dissatisfaction in face of an extensive level of party patronage (De Winter 
et al. 1996).47 Article 6 of the 1995 law penalizes the non-submission of both declarations 
with a fine between 600-6000€. It also postulates that criminal sanctions are applicable for 
                                                          
45 See Chambre des Representants de Belgique, Doc. Parl., 54 1828/001, 19th May 2016.  
46 This explains several proposals for further simplification of the declaratory system in the post-2004 period. 
See Chambre des Representants de Belgique, Doc. Parl., 2008-2009, 1507/001, p. 5. 





the public office-holders in case of forgery and use of falsified documents (Article 194 of the 
Criminal Code) with ten to fifteen years’ imprisonment plus incidental penalties (Article 31 
of the Criminal Code). Regarding sanctions underpinning preventive mechanisms, the 
anticorruption Law of 10th February 1999 introduced criminal penalties for any person 
holding public office who acquired interests unlawfully (Transparency International 2012: 
49).48 This already extensive arsenal of sanctions was complementedin 2014 by the new 
Rules of Procedure of the Low Chamber. They introduced political sanctions (exclusion from 
confidential proceedings, possibly all proceedings) and pecuniary sanctions (withholding of 
emoluments) for the misuse of confidential information.49 
 
Discussion  
Table 3 reports key findings of the case studies, identifying four institutional features as 
central for shaping the choice of COI mechanisms in line with our theoretical expectations 
(e.g. Knill 1998; Lodge 2003; Clift and Fisher 2004). In essence, the nature of the executive-
legislative relations as well as the nature of administrative traditions fundamentally shaped 
the ‘fit’ of transparency measures and formal-legal sanctions in the two institutional settings 
analyzed. This finding is coherent with previous research that drew on historical 
institutionalist theory to assess the impact of politico-administrative structures upon cross-
national variation in reform choices (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2017).  
 
                                                          
48 Article 245 of the Criminal Code carries a prison sentence of one to five years and/or a fine and/or exclusion 
from office, separating taking an interest while holding public office from instances of corruption.  
49Legal Department of the Belgian House of Representatives, Rules of Procedure of the Belgian House of 





With regard to the nature of the executive-legislative relations, our analysis confirms that 
majoritarian systems like the UK facilitate rapid and large-scale reform whereas incremental 
decision-making takes place in consensual systems like Belgium (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2017: 
47; Lijphart 2012). It also shows that majoritarian systems generate an appreciation of 
transparency since their accountability processes are based on popular control which 
apportions blame to individuals or groups (McCarthy-Cotter and Flinders 2018: 201). 
Accordingly, UK parliamentarians – to a considerable extent – were able to fended off 
demands for independent enforcement and sanctions to start with, referring to long-
standing notions of parliamentary privilege and sovereignty. Conversely, consensual systems 
like Belgium are built on a notion of keeping the process of elite bargaining secret, with little 
direct intervention by the public at large (Peters 2006: 1087). This gave elites some latitude 
to accommodate fragmented interests by means of patronage but it raised credibility issues 
that were dealt with through independent enforcement and sanctions. 
As for the nature of the administrative tradition, Rechtsstaat systems like Belgium 
are stickier and slower to reform than ‘public interest’ systems like the UK (Pierre 1995: 8). 
This is because reform choices and their implementation do not require statutory action in 
the latter (Pollitt 2013). Conversely, a codified body of law regulates any action of public 
office holders in Belgium where the judiciary assures that legal procedures are being 
followed. Differences between administrative traditions are amplified by broader variations 
in societal values, such as differences in power distance and uncertainty avoidance 
(Hofstede 2001). Belgium scores a lot higher than UK on both indexes and this widens the 
gulf between the legalist and the flexible approaches to reform, which are embedded in the 





Furthermore and also in line with institutionalist accounts of path dependency 
(Mahoney 2000: 528), the link between COI and state reform (Bezes and Parrado 2003: 45) 
played an important role. Whereas in the UK COI reform has been developed on an ad hoc 
basis, in Belgium it has been part of comprehensive state reforms. This link has broadened 
the scope of COI reform, thus multiplying veto points as well as exacerbating legalist 
intricacies of implementation. Finally, pre-existing legal provisions shaping the rights and the 
obligations of parliamentarians fed into debates on whether to adopt disclosing or 
preventive COI measures respectively. Sensitivity towards the downsides of transparency 
measures has been higher in Belgium with its stronger protections of MP privacy, whereas 





Table 3: Differences in COI Reform and their Implications 
 
Institutional Factors BELGIUM UK 
Nature of Executive-
Legislative Relations 
High number of parties working in oversized coalition 
governments bridging ideological and territorial divides 
Implications:  
 Blurred lines of accountability and secrecy facilitating 
agreement between multiple partners creating resistance 
against transparency measures 
 Decision-making costs of negotiating/passing reform proposals 
high 
Alternation between ideologically narrow, single party 
governments 
Implications:  
 Clear lines of accountability enhancing the suitability of 
transparency as a disciplining mechanism 
 






 Demanding legal procedures for changing COI machinery 
 Involvement of state authorities outside parliament (e.g. 
courts) in rule implementation 
 Broad cultural climate of high uncertainty avoidance and power 
distance strengthening the legalist approach 
“Public Interest” System 
Implications:  
 No need of statutory change for changing COI machinery 
 No involvement of state authorities outside parliament (e.g. 
courts) in rule implementation 
 Broad cultural climate of low uncertainty avoidance and 
power distance sustaining the flexible approach 
Intersection between 
COI and State Reform 
COI reform linked with broader reform efforts tackling wider 
systemic crises (i.e. partitocracy and federalism) 
Implications: 
 Broad scope of the reforms encompassing multiple public 
offices beyond Parliament 
 Increasingly stricter reforms, but delayed implementation due 
to the scope of regulation 
COI reform not linked to other reform efforts 
 
Implications: 
 Narrow scope of the reforms confined to Parliament 
 
 Reforms as a short-term responses to specific scandals 




Rights / Obligations 
Affecting COI 
Regulation 
Weak freedom of information provisions applicable to 
parliamentarians/strong provisions to protect MPs’ privacy 
 
Implications: 
 Resistance against transparency measures 
Strong freedom of information provisions applicable to 
parliamentarians/weak provisions to protect MPs’ privacy 
 
Implications: 





Importantly, our case studies have highlighted the importance of types of reform sequences 
which can be reactive or self-reinforcing (Mahoney 2000; Pollitt 2008; Howlett 2009). COI 
regimes in both the UK and Belgium have become more constraining over time as visible in 
their high strictness scores (see Figure C1, Online Appendix C). Yet once attention on 
parliamentary ethics died down in the UK, provisions were partially relaxed – mostly 
justified by practical difficulties in implementation or by undesirable side-effects of overly 
strict regulation that was quickly adopted in the aftermath of a crisis. These reactive ‘cycles’ 
reflecting the salience of COI issues echo not only the majoritarian character of British 
executive-legislative relations with the government (usually) able to rely on stable 
parliamentary support but also the fact that COI reform is implemented through changes of 
intra-parliamentary rules as statutory action is not required by the ‘public interest’ model of 
administrative tradition. The lack of interaction between COI reform and other areas of 
state reform, contributed to keeping the reform process flexible, allowing for COI 
mechanisms to be designed as a narrow response to scandals involving MPs. As a response 
to scandals, transparency measures were expanded for citizens to punish the government in 
office as ‘alternative enforcement mechanism’, mechanisms unsuitable in the Belgian 
setting with its oversized government coalitions and its strong protection of privacy.  
In the Belgian context the embeddedness of COI reform in wider state reform 
sequences operates in conjunction with the consensual nature of executive-legislative 
relations and the Rechtsstaat tradition. By extending the scope of COI regulation to a wide 
array of public office holders, this factor has increased political costs of reform as well as 
making legal procedures for implementing change more demanding. The ‘spill over’ effect 
produced by the inclusion of COI reform into a broader agenda of administrative 





are changed through statutory reforms implying independent enforcement by state 
authorities that are equipped with severe sanctions. Legal provisions have proliferated over 
time in a “self-reinforcing” fashion but they have become increasingly complex, reflecting 
Belgium’s legalistic tendencies towards rigid legal procedures associated with Napoleonic 
legal traditions (Heibraut and Storme 2006: 648-9; Beck et al 2003) that parliamentarians 




Over the last decade, the diversity of conflict of interest (COI) regulation applied to national 
parliamentarians (as well as other public officials) has grown significantly in many 
democracies. Defined as the range of formal-legal restrictions to assure parliamentarians’ 
impartial or unbiased decision-making (Nikolov 2013: 407), COI regulation embraces diverse 
mechanisms such as requirements for asset disclosure but also incompatibilities of 
parliamentary office with other private or public roles. This growing diversity creates a 
major challenge for cross-national research: the development of measures capturing the 
different components of increasingly complex ethics regimes in an unbiased fashion, able to 
‘travel’ a wider range of democracies, as well as understanding the rationales behind often 
very distinct regulatory choices in this contentious area of regulation. 
This paper conceptually distinguished core dimensions of COI regimes and developed cross-
national indices to capture the nature of COI regimes currently in place in Europe 
empirically: COI Strictness (covering the strictness of rules and enforcement), COI Sanctions 
and COI Transparency. Based on a new dataset covering 27 European democracies we 





importance of systematically exploring and studying the sources of the diversity within COI 
regimes applied to national parliamentarians. Studying the empirical variation allowed us to 
select two extreme cases in terms of the particular choices of COI mechanisms – Belgium (a 
sanction-oriented regime) and the UK (a transparency-oriented regime) – to explore the 
institutional drivers of these regulatory tendencies over time. 
 
Our case studies revealed how the nature of the institutional settings constrain the choice 
of reform measures chosento address the same problem, by making the same arguments 
more or less effective depending on the environment parliamentarians operated 
in.Measures imposing reputational and political costs on MPs through public disclosure 
were brought up in both systems as alternative to external enforcement and formal-legal 
sanction mechanisms, but were much more effectively employedin the majoritarian 
democracy of the UK than in consensualBelgium, underpinning a focus on transparency 
measures in the former. Similarly, privacy considerations fed into debates on COI 
transparency measures in both settings, yet were much more effectively used againstthe 
adoption or to weaken the COI transparency measures in Belgium. The functioning of the 
latter fundamentally rests on often secretive negotiations between party elites, lowering 
expectations towards the clear-cut responsibility of individual political actors and raising 
sensitivity towards the downsides of transparency measures. 
These findings are of particular relevance for old democracies, which unlike new 
democracies are less affected by external pressures, hence, where reform processes are 
most exposed to domestic institutional factors highlighted by historical institutionalist 
accounts of cross-national variation of reform choices (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2017).This is 





towards sanctions or transparency mechanisms respectively (see Figure 2). Though the 
study of extreme cases allowed us to distil the drivers of highly distinct regulatory choices 
with particular clarity, to avoid overgeneralization (Bennett 2004: 40-1) future research 
needs to complement our findings with the study of cases that have adopted constraining 
COI regimes by combining both types of mechanisms. Ideally such a study would include not 
only old but also new democracies, and contrast internal institutional constraints as 
explored in this paper with external pressures pushing COI regimes in new democracies 
increasingly into similar directions (see Figure 1). While these challenges need to be 
addressed in future research, the cross-national assessment provided here, can provide a 
systematic foundation to address them. 
 
Finally, our findings points to the institutional constraints that are involved in processes of 
regulatory innovation such as those promoted by GRECO evaluations. If COI regimes are 
shaped by institutional factors, we can expect limited effectiveness of collaborative peer 
reviews in promoting the implementation of those measures that require far-reaching 
changes in existing institutional arrangements (Holzinger and Knill 2005: 791). This scenario 
applies to the evolution of the Belgian case after the GRECO evaluation, in which the reform 
process remains at an “embryonic stage” (GRECO 2018: 15) with regard to the 
implementation of recommendations on transparency measures. The comparative analysis 
of developments triggered by GRECO evaluation is a promising avenue for future research, 
which can draw on our set of institutional factors to investigate how international standards 
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